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Protection may be a second-best policy when the  By choosing a "moderate" wage, the central
domestic sector is imperfectly competitive. But  trade union replicates the effects of a subsidy to
the optimal tariff depends oI labor market  the imperfectly competitive sector so that no
institutions too.  government intervention is required.
Rama considers two theoretical settings. The  In Latin America, decentralized wage
first is fully centralized wage bargaining, where  bargaining increases the wedge between the
all workers are unionized and wage differentials  sectoral productivities of labor. While wages in
are redistu buted among workers (the  the export sector are constrained by harsh
"Scandinavia" case). The second is negotiation  competition in world markets, trade unions in the
at the firm level, where workers are unionized in  domestic sector can get higher wages without
iw.perfectly competitive sectors only, and wages  completely squeezing labor demand. An import
may differ from sector to sector (the "Latin  tariff improves manpower allocation by
America" case).  He uses the case of the com-  reorienting demand toward the domestic sector.
petitive labor market as a benchmark.  SInce the second-best tariff is strictly positive,
opening the economy leads to a drop in welfare.
In Scandinavia, free trade maximizes wel-
fare. The central trade union internalizes the  Rama's  analysis sheds some light on the
consequences of imperfect competition in the  political economy of protection. Particularly, it
domestic sector. Since prices in this sector are a  suggests that trade liberalization is more likely to
mark-up over labor costs, there is a wedge  raise welfare in the Latin America case when it
between the sectoral productivities of labor and,  is accompanied by changes in labor market
therefore, an inefficient allocation of manpower.  institutions.
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Although  the welfare  theorems  of the theory  of international  trade  imply
the  optimality  of free  trade,  there  are  some  relevant  qualifications,  even
within  the  framework  of the  traditional  approach. Among the second-best
arguments  for  protection,  the  case  of  a  government  confronting  monopoly  in  the
labor  market  in  well  known. 1 If  policies  dealinq  directly  with  this
distortion  cannot  be  implemented,  then  the  oecond-best  policy  is  to  impose  a
tariff  on  imports,  so  am to  increase  labor  demand.
However,  the  optimal  tariff  level  depends  on  the  prevailing  wage  setting
mechanism  too,  or  more  generally,  on  labor  market  institutions.  In  addition
to  the  perfectly  competitive  labor  market  case,  this  paper  considers  two
"pure6  institutional  arrangements.  In  the  first  one,  all  workers  are
unionized,  there  is  a  fully  centralized  negotiation,  and wage  differentials
are  redistributed  among  workers.  In the  second  one,  workers  are  unionized  in
imperfectly  competitive  sectors  only,  the  negotiation  is  carried  out  at  the
firm  level,  and  wages  may  differ  from  sector  to  sector.
These  settinge  are  called  the  Scandinavian  case  and  the  Latin  American
case  respectively.  These  labels  are  not  intended  to  imply  that  the  settings 
in  the  paper  faithfully  describe  reality,  but  rather  to  remind  the  ongoing
debate  on  the  virtues  of  corporatism.  Indeed,  many  authors  have  suggested
that  negotiation  at  the  national  level,  as  in  Austria  and  the  Nordic
countries,  makes  workers  internalize  the effects  of wage setting. 2 Pervasive
free  riding  by distributive  coalitions,  in  turn, is often  seen  as a
distinctive  feature  of Latin  American  countries.
I  See, for  instanc&,  Bhagwati  (1971)  and  Corden (1984).
2  This idea  is discussed  by Olson (1982),  Bruno  and Sachs  (1985),
Calmfors  and  Driffill  (1988)  and  Rama (forthcoming),  among  others.In order  to highlight  the  role  of labor  market  institutions,  the paper
assumes  an imperfectly  competitive  domestic  sector. Labor being  the  only
productior.  factor,  the price  of domestic  goods is a  mark-up  over  wages.
Hence,  if  the lahor  market  is  competitive,  there is a  wedge  between  the
sectoral  productivities  of labor. This inefficiency  can be corrected  by means
of an employment  subsidy  shifting  labor  towards  the  domestic  sector. However,
a tariff  on  imports  may  be preferred  to the subsidy  if  the latter  has high
operating  costs.
Consider  now the  Latin  American  case.  Since  the  domestic  sector  is
imperfectly  competitive,  the  corresponding  trade  unions  can get  higher  wages
without  completely  squeezing  labor  demand.  But  wages  in  the  export  sector  are
constrained  because  of  harsh  competition  in  world  markets.  Therefore,  there
is a  sectoral  wage differential,  which increases  the  wedge  between  the
sectoral  productivities  of labor. The inefficiency  being  larger  than in the
former  case,  a  higher  tariff  rate  is  required.
in  the  Scandinavian  case,  the  central  trade  union  internalizes  the
consequences  of inefficient  manpower  allocation. By choosing  a "p,I;1erate"
wage level  for  the  domestic  sector,  it replicates  the effects  an employment
subsidy  would  have  on labor  allocation,  so that no tariff  is required. Since
this  would lead  to a sectoral  wage  differential  (with  the opposite  sign
compared  to the Latin  American  case),  the central  trade  union has  to "tax"
workers  in  the  export  sector  and  redistribute  the  proceeds  among  all  its
members.
This  intuitive  discussion  sheds  some  light  on  the  political  economy  of
protection. In  the  Scandinavian  case,  free  trade  is  the  first-best  policy  in
spite  of  imperfect  competition  in  both  the  labor  market  and  the  market  for
domestic  goods.  In  the  Latin  American  case,  on  the  contrary,  there  is  a
strictly  positive  second-best  tariff,  so  that  opening  up  the  economy  leads  to
a welfare  drop.  Thus,  labor  market  institutions  provide  some  rationale  for
the difference  between  "corporatist"  and "populist"  policy  making.
2The  paper  is  organized  an  follows.  Section  2  presents  the  basic
assumptions  of  the  model,  particularly  as  regards  individuals'  and  firms'
behavior.  Section  3  determines  the  second-beut  tarLff  level  when  the  labor
market  is  competitive.  Sections  4  and  S  analyze  the  Scandinavian  and  LatLn
American  cases  respectively.  Section  6  draws  some  consequences  regarding  the
political  economy  of  protection  and  trade  liberalization.  Sectlon  7
concludes.
2.  The  Model
The  structure  of  the  economy  is  similar  to  the  one  considered  by  Hnlpman
and  Razin (1983). There  is a perfectly  competitive  export  sector,  which
produoes  a  composLte  good  and  faces  an  infinitely  elastic  demand  curve  in
world  markets.  Export  revenues  are  used  to  pay  for  imports  of  a  composite
good Mr  which  there is  no domestic  production,  and  whose  world supply  is
infLnitely  elastic. Units  are chosen  so that  the international  prices  of both
the  exported  and  the imported  goods  are equal  to one.
There is also an imperfectly  compotitive  domestic  sector,  which  produces
a diffarentiated  good.  Free entry  endogenously  determines  the number  n of
varietIes  available,  given  the existence  of fixed  production  costs.  These
varieties  can  be  seen  either  as  traditional  non-traded  goods  (e.g.  services)
or as  domestic-taste  substitutes  for  the imported  good.  The first
interlretation  Ls  best suited  to the Scandinavian  case;  the second  one,  to the
Latin  American  case.
All individuals  have the same  preferences,  represented  by the utility
function  U:
E  ~~~~~~~~n  (a-i)/a  aao/(a-l)  n  1-a-n
U  8  tZc 1 Cmcx
i-1
3where  a >  0, B  ,  0, a+B  <  I  and  a >  1.  In  this expression,  ci  represents  the
consumption  of  the  variety  i of  the  domestic  good,  ca is  the consumption  of
the imported  good,  and  CX  Lu  the  consumption  of  the  exported  good.
The  budget  constraint  in given  by:
n
Y . E  Pic,  +  eSc  +  cs
i-l
where  Y represents  nominal  income,  Pi  is the  price  of the variety  i of the
domestic  good  and  e  (a 1) is the  tariff-inclusive  price  of the imported  good.
It in assumed  that  e  is  an economic  policy  instrument  controlled  by the
government.
The Cobb-Douglas  aspect  of the utility  function  U implies  that the
income  share  devoted  to  the  coneumption  of  each  of  the  three  types  of  goods  is
constant:
n
S  Pic,  - aY  ,  ecn  - BY  '  - (1-a-S)Y  (1)
The  embedded  C.B.S.  aspect  of  the  function,  in  turn,  implies:
ay  Pi  -a
ci  - (-)  (2)
nPd  Pd
where  Pd  is the  standard  average  price  of  the n varieties  of the  domestic
good:
n  1-a  1/(1-a)
e  (E  Pi  )/n  l  (3)
i-1
4The  general  price  index  P irs
a 
P - Pde  (4)
Replacing  equations (1)  to (4)  into  function  U leado  to the individual's
utility  l-Vol:
a  B  1-a-B a/(o-1)
V - a a  (1-a-B)  n  (Y/P)  (5)
The  n  varieties  of  the  domestic  good  and  the export  good are  produced
with labor  only.  The  physical  productivity  of  labor  is constant  in  both
sectors.  It is  normalized  to  one  in  the  domestic  sector,  and is equal  to e in
the  export  sector. Whereas  the  export  sector  is-lperfectly  competitive,  there
is only  one firm  producing  each  of the varieties  of the  domestic  good.  The
number  n of varieties  is constrained  by  the  existence  of  a  fixed  cost  of
production  of  the  domestic  good,  which  is  assumed  to  be  proportional  to  the
general  price  index  P.
Firm  i  maximizes  pure  profits  Si.  For  a  fixed  cost  of  production  equal
to  f  in  real  terms:
B i - ciPi  - LjW 1 - fP
where  WI  represents  the  wage  firm  i  has  to  pay  to  its  workers.  Because  of  the
assumptions  on  technology,  Li  - c1,  with  the  analytical  expression  of  c;  given
by  equation  (2).  On  the  other  hand,  if  n  is  large  enough,  firm i  has  no
incidence  on either  average  prices,  aggregate  income,  or the number  of
varieties  of the domestic  good.  Therefore,  the  price it sets is:
a
P - -. W;  (6)
o-1
5In equilibrium,  pure  profits  should  be zero  because  of free  entry  into
the  domestic  sector. After  replacing  Li  - ci  and equations  (2)  and (6)  into
the analyitoal  expressicn  of B;,  the zero-profit  condition  can  be  written  an:
aY  Pi  1-a
n -- I-)  (7)
afP  Pd
The  model  is  completed  by imposing  the equilibrium  of the balance  cf
trade.  Since  there  are  no  fixed  costs  of production  in  the export  sector,  and
there  is  no  domestic  production  of  the  imported  good,  exports  equal  imports
measured  at international  prices  ift
eLX  - Cx  m  (8)
where  L,  measures  employment  in  the  export  octor.
3.  Competitive  Labor  Xarket
When the  labor  market  is  perfectly  competitive,  all  workers  earn  the
same  wage,  equal  to  the  marginal  productivity  of  labor  in  'he  export  sector.
The  latter  is constant,  given  the  assumptions  on technology  and  the  elasticity
of foreign  demand. Therefore,  the labor-demand  schedule  becomes  flat  at  the
wage level  e, and  there  is full  employment. Normalizing  labor  supply  to one,
this impliess
n
Wi  a  ,  L  +  E L  - 1
i-i
6Since  all domestic  firms  pay  the same  wage,  P - Pd  for all L  (se
equation  (3)).  Replacing  Li  - c  and  equations  (1)  and  (8)  into  the
full-employment  condition  leads  to ths following  expression  for  nominal
inceom
-1  -1  -1
Y - e(  aePd + SO  +  (1-a-8)  1  (9)
where  the average  price  Pd  of domettic  goods  is:
a
Pd  "  - (10!
o-1
Hence,  the  wedge  between  the  marginal  productivities  of  labor  in  the  two
sectors  is equal  to the  mark-up  ratio  a/(o-l).
Equations  (5),  (7),  (4),  (9)  and (10)  allow  writing  the  utility  level
associated  with a  competitive  labor  market (UM)  as function  of  eS
l-a  a-i a  -13  a-1  -1  -1  i+a/(0'l)
u(e)  - z.{  e  (-)  0  (  a.-  +  a3  +  (i-a-fS)  1  }  (ii)
a  a
witht
a B  1-a-f  a  a/(a-l)
z  - a  n  (1-a-f)  C-)
of
The relationship between UM and e  is represented Ln Figure  1.  The
maximum welfare level is reached for 0 - e0,  with:
1-B  a
1 <  qM  <  - (12)
a-1  a-1
a.-  +  (i-a-fl)
a
7Therefore,  the optimal  tar_.ff-inclusive  price  of imports  in a Ftsher  index  of
the  ratios  a/to-l)  (for  the  domestic  sector)  and 1 (for  the export  sector),
with weights  given  by the  corresponding  consumption  uhares.
(Inaert  Figure  1)
The  rationale  for  protection  comes  from  the  wedge  between  the sectoral
productivities  of labor,  which  reflects  an inefficient  manpower  allocation. 3
The  tariff  on imports  shifts  demand  towards  the  domestic  sector.  If there  was
no domestic  consumption  of the  expo.rted  good (a+8  - 1),  then  protection  would
allow  reaching  the first  best.  Indeed,  in  this case  qM - a/(o-l),  so that
the  price  of domestic  goods  relative  to the  price  of imported  goods  would  be
e, the same  as the ratio  between  the sectoral  productivities  of labor.
Except  for  this limiting  case,  the first-best  policy  would  be a sectoral
employment  subsidy. If  the  private  cost  per  worker  in  the domestic  sector  was
Wi  - (a-l)e/o,  then  the  price  of domestic  goods  would  reflect  the  mArginal
productivity  of labor  (Pd  - e).  However,  employment  subsidies  may  be
difficult  to implement,  particularly  in developing  countries. Hence,  for  a+S
close  enough  to one,  protection  may still  be the  best available  policy.  This
is assumed  in  what follows.
4.  'Scandinavian"  Trade  Unions
The "Scandinavian"  label  is  used to identify  in an abridged  manner  labor
market  institutions  characterized  by three  features. First,  all individuals
In this sense,  the setting  is similar  to the  one in the appendix
of Bentolila  and  Blanchard  (1990).









II  ~~~~~~~COare  unionized. Second,  wages are  unilaterally  set  by a central  trade  union
operating  at the national  level. 4 And  third,  if optimal  wage. differ  from
sector  to  sector,  then  the  union  redistributes  earnings  so  that  in  the  end  all
members  receive  an equal  pay.
Note that  this third  feature  is  not  actually  essential  to the  model.
Its  only goal ia  to replicate  the  heavy  taxation  of labor  incomes  which
characterizes  the "corporatist"  model. 5 However,  the  main analytical  results
would  be unchanged  if  wage differential,  were not allowed.  Since  this  woulti
lead  to pure  profits  in  the export  sector,  the  model  should  have to be
completed  by the assumption  that  pure  profits  are fully  reverted  to workers  in
one  way  or  another.
The  central  trade  union  has  no interest  in moving  wages in  the export
sector  from  their  competitive  level  e.  Indeed,  a lower  wage level  would  lead
to pure profits. A higher  wage level,  in turn,  would squeeze  the firms  in
this  sector  out of the  market,  given  that labor  productivity  is constant  and
foreign  demand  is  infinitell  elastic.  By contrast,  because  of imperfect
competition  in  the  domestic  sector,  the  central  trade  union  can  set  the
corresponding  wage  level  either  above  or  below  e.
Since  the  central  trade  un'on  is  fully  encompassing,  it internalizes  the
effects  of wage  setting  on both the  general  price level  P and the  number  of
varieties  n  of the  domestic  good.  Therefore,  its  objective  function  T8 and
the  objective  function  Us  of the  planner  are  one and  the same.  For  WI  - WS
being  the  wage level  in the  domestic  sector,  it follows  that:
a  -a  -3  a  - -1  -1  1+a/(o-l)
Ts  - z.{  O(-.ws)  e  I  ae  (-.ws)  +  Be  +  (1-a-B)  ]  }  (13)
a-1  a-1
4  But firms  decide  on employment,  i.e.  they keep the "right  to
manage". This corresponds  to the  monopoly  union  model (see
Oswald,  1985).
See  Summers,  Gruber  and  Vergara  (1992).
9(this is the same as for UM,  but replacing W;  =  e by WI  - Ws).  The difference
between the central trade union and the government is that the latter decides
about e,  whereas the control variable of the former is WS.
The objective function Ts has a maximum for:
a-1  1-a
Ws(S) =  . .e  (14)
a  -1
se  +  (1-a-s)
The wage Ws resulting from equation (14) is an upward function of the
tariff-inclusive price of imports.  It is equal to e for e =  e1,  with:
Ba  a
_e=  >  _  (15)
Bo - (1-a)  o-l
Therefore, the central trade union redistributes earnings from export-sector
workers to domestic-sector workers if e  el ,  and the other way round if 8 >
81.  Figure 2 represents the relationship between Ws  and the tariff-inclusive
price of imports.
(Insert Figure 2)
Replacing the analytical expression of Ws into equation (13) gives the
objective function Us  of the government when labor market institutions are of
the Scandinavian type:
1-a -B  1-a  1-a  1+a/(a-l)
Us(e)  z.{  e  e  ]  }  (16)
-1
se  +  (1-a-B)








C/)~~~~~~~~~~~~~atrade unions is the same as if the labor market was competitive for e  - el.
This is because wages are equal to e across sectors in both cases.  But except
for this tangency point, welfare is higher in the Scandinavian setting.
If there was no domestic consumption of the exported good (a+B =  1),
then e1 - GM  - a/(a-l)  and Us(e) - uM(eM)  for all 0.  Since there would be
only one relative price, the central trade union would always be able to set
Ws in such a way that the domestic sector attains its optimal size.  According
to equations  (6) and (14), for a+B  1, the wage level Ws would be such that
the ratio between the prices of domestic goods and imported goods would always
be e, no matter the level of e.  This would reflect the actual relationship
between the sectoral productivities of labor.  However, in the general case
(a+8 c  1), equation  (16) implies dUs/de  <  0 for all e  >  1,  so that the optimal
tariff-inclusive price of imports is:
-s 1  (17)
5.  "Latin  American"  Trade  Unions
The "Latin American" label is used to indicate labor market institutions
whose main features are exactly opposite to those characterizing the
Scandinavian case.  First, not all individuals are unionized, which means that
the economy is "dual" from the institutional viewpoint.  Second, there is a
fully decentralized negotiation, so that each union has an incidence on the
wage level paid by its own firm only.  Finally, there is no redistribution of
sectoral wage differentials.
The firms in which there are no trade unions are those producing the
exported good.  Indeed, the productivity of labor being constant at level e,
and foreign demand being infinitely elastic at price one, a firm that pays
11more than e to its workers is squeezed out of the market.  Since there is no
room to raise wages, there is no rationale for homogeneous workers to unionize
either.  It follows that W, =  e for all e.
Things are different in the domestic sector.  Let Mi  =  M/n <  1/n be the
membership of the trade union operating in firm i.  If the wage set by the
union is  such that Li  <  M/n, some of its members have to move to the export
sector, where they earn Wx =  e.  Therefore, the expected utility of a member
of the trade union in firm i can be written as:
a a  l-a-3  a/  (a-l)  Li  Li  -1
TL  =  a  3  (1-a-B)  n  [ -.Wi +  (1 - -)e  1P  (18)
(see  equation (5)).  Under a utilitarian approach, TL is the objective
function of the union in firm i.
The employment level Li  is also a function of Wi.  Since the productivity
of labor in the domestic sector is equal to one,  Li  =  ci,  with ci  given by
equation (2).  On the other hand,  since  labor  demand  in  the  export  sector is
infinitely  elastic, there is full employment, and the equilibrium  level of
output Y is still given by equation (9).  Taking equation  (6) into account:
a-l  a  -o  -1  -1  -1
Li=  (c/n)Pd  (-.Wi)  e( aePd  +  Be  +  (1-a-B)  (19)
a-1
Decisions by the trade union in firm i have no significant effect on the
general price indexes Pd  and P, nor on the number n of varieties of the
domestic good.  Hence, the wage level WL that maximizes TL is:
a
WL =  .e  (20)
o-l
12Equation  (20)  means  that  wages  in  the  domestic  sector  are  a  mark-up  over  wages
in  the  non-unionized  sector  of  the  economy,  with  the  mark-up  ratio  being  the
one  used  by  the  corresponding  firms  to  net  their  prices.  The  lower  the
elasticity of substitution between varieties of the domestic good, the larger
the wage dlfferential.  Therefore,  "duality" results ln this model from
imperfect competition in the domestic sector.
However,  the  wage  level  indicated  in equation  (20) can be such that
LI(WL)  N  M/n.  In  this  case,  none  of  the  union  members  has  to  move  to  the
export  sector,  and  the  objective  function  TL  in  equation  (18)  becomes:
a  B  1-a-B  a/(o-1)  -1
TL - a  B  (1-a-S)  n  WiP  (18')
This reflects the fact that hiring outsiders does not increase the utility
level of insiders.  Now, the trade union in firm L  sets Wi in order to
maximize  TL subject to Li  - M/n.  The equilibrium wage level WL can be drawn
from equations (6) and (19) under the symmetry condition Pi-  Pds
1-N a-1  a
WL(O)  - - - -e  (20')
M4  a  -1
3.0  I  (1-a-B)
When WL is determined by equation  (20),  the aggregate utility level has
the following analytical expression:
l-a  a-1 2a  -8  o-l  2  -1  -1  l+a/(a-l)
uL(e)  - z.{  e  (-  )  e  a(  -)  +  130  +  (1-a-B)  3  )  (21)
a  o
13(this  is  the same as for  UM, but  with WI  = WL instead  of WI  - e) 6  This
expression has a  maximum for e  - e2,  with:
1-B  a  2 eM  e e2  - <  (-)  (22)
o-l 2  a-1
a( )  +  (l-a-13)
Note  that  the  optimal  tariff  in  higher  than  in  the  competitive  labor  market
caue.  This  iu  because  Latin  American  trade  unions  increase  the labor
productivity  wedge from  o/(a-l)  to  (a/(a-1)12  (see  equations  (6)  And  (20)).
Hence,  the  required  demand  shift  is larger  than  before.
When WL is determined  by equation  (20'),  in turn,  the aggregate  utility
level  becomest
1-a  1-a  a  -3  -1  a-1  l+a/(a-l)
UL(e)  - z  a{  e  (1-M)  (M/a) e  t  3.6  +  (a-a-s)  I  1  (21')
(the  involved  equations  are  the same  as before). This expression  is
decreasing  in  6.  Tariffs  lead  now  to a  loss  of consumers,  surplus  only.  They
do not  affect  the sectoral  allocation  of manpower  anymore,  since  insiders
appropriate  all the  resulting  transfer.
In contrast,  as long  as some  of the  union  members  have  to work in the
export sector, the wage level in the domestic  sector  is  constant,  and
6mployment  is  an  upward  function  of  e.  Suppose  there  exists  a
6  Equation  (21)  can  be chosen  as the aggregate  utility  level,
despite  the  fact  that  earnings  differ  from  individual  to
individual,  based  on the  Hicks-Xaldor  compensation  criterion.
Redistribution  does  not affect  the number  of varieties  n of the
domestic  good,  nor  the  general  price  index  P, so that  the
individual  utility  level  is a linear  function  of nominal  income
(see  equation  (5)).
14tariff-inclusive  price  of Imports  e  - e3 such  that Li  becomes  equal  to M/n.
Clearly,  if  62 4  e,  the  highent  welfare  level  is attained  for e  - e2.  If,  on
the contrary,  e2  >  e6,  thea  the government  has  no interest  in raising  the
tariff-inclusive  price  of ;imports  above  e3.
The critical  value  4 depends  on the  membership  M of Latin  American
unions. From  equations  (19)  and  (20),  it  follows  that:
: 
.3-
1-M  a-1  2
aX )  (  )-  (l-a-13)
N  a
Assume  that  the "initial"  membership  M is  the total  number  of workers  in  the
domestic  sector  "before"  mkionization  (i.e.  for  W  - e).  Such  a membership
depends  on the "initial'  tariff  level,  but is  never lower  that the  employment
that  would  have resulted from  free  trade ii.e.  for e  - 1).  Therefore,
according  to equations  (10)  and (19),  M a a(a-1)/(a-a),  so that  63  >  S1.
In  summary,  the  optlnal  policy  with  Latin  American  labor  market
institutions  is to choose*d  - eL such  thats
eM C  eL  - Min {  e2  6  }
in  a  long-run  perspective,  one  can  expect  unionized  workers  who  are  unable  to
find  a  job  in  the domestic  sector  to resiliate  their  membership. 7 Hence,  eL
is  also  the critical  value for  which  the  wage setting  rule switches  from
equation  (20)  to (20')..  Umilarly, the  utility  level  is the one in equation
(21)  for  e s  .L,  but  the  ce  in  equation  (21')  for  e  a  eL.  Figures  1 and  2
7  This endogenefty  of membership  is what leads  to hysteresis  of the
employment  leuel in  unionized  countries,  according  to Blanchard
and  Summers  .(D87).
15represent  UL and  WL as functions  of the tariff-inclusive  price  of imports.
6.  Trade  Liberalization
The  impact  of  labor  market  institutions  on  welfare  can  be  assessed  by
replacing  the  optimal  level  of  e  associated  with  each  of  the  three  settings
(competitive  labor  market,  Scandinavian  unions  and  Latin  American  unione)  into
the  aggregate  utility  function.  Squations  (11),  (12),  (16),  (17),  (21)  and
(22)  yields
i-a  a-i  a  1-B  a-1  B-1 Flu/aa-1)
nM(eM)  ' 2't  *  (-)  (1-B)  [  a.-  +  (i-a-B)  1  I
g  o
1-a 1Fa/ (a-1)
Us(es)  - Z.{ e  }
i-a  a-i  2a  1-B  a-i 2  B-1 i+a/(o-l)
UL  (L)  - Z. {  e  -)  (i-B)  (  a.(-)  +  (1-a-B)  1  )
a  a
where  US(eS)  '  VM(GM) >  UL(t)  as shown  by points  8, H and  L in Figure  1 (the
proof  is  presented  in  the Appendix). 8
Consequently,  compared  to  the  competitive  labor  market  case,
Scandinavian  inatitutlons  improve  welfare  whereas  Latin  American  institutions
reduce  it.  This means,  particularly,  that fully  centralized  wage bargaining
and  negotiation  at the firm level  are  not equivalent,  contrarily  to the
assertion  by Calmfors  and  Driffill  (1988). This is due  to the  existence  of a
distortion  (the  productivity  wedge  between  sectors)  whose  effects  are
8  It is implicitly  assumed  that  eL  - 2.  if  this was not  the case,
the Latin  American  welfare  level  would  ba lower.
16amplified  by the lack  of coordination  between  trade  unione. 9
The  welfare  comparison  above  stands  on the assumption  that tariff
determination  is based  on a Pigouvian  approach. However,  actual  trade
policies  may result  from  rules  of thumb,  rather  than from  an accurate
appraisal  of the  prevailing  market  imperfections. Typically,  drawing  from  the
traditional  textbook  approach,  governments  are  likely  to favor  free  trade
under  all  circunstances.  This  has  interesting  consequences  from  the  political
economy  viewpoint.
in  the Scandinavian  case,  setting  e  - 1 leads  to the first  best,  no
matter  whether  free  trade  is chosen  for  the  right  or the  wrong  reasons.  In
the  Latin  American  case,  on the  contrary,  moving  from  e  - eL  to e  - 1  reduces
welfare,  since  it leads  to an excessively  small  domestic  sector.  In  terme  of
Figure  1, the  relevant  comparison  is  now between  points  S and B, rather  than S
and  L.  Hence,  under  a realistic  approach  to economic  policy,  the  welfare  gap
resulting  from  different  institutional  settings  may be even higher  than
suggested  by the  P4gouvian  approach.
The  model results  can  account  for  the  observed  resistance  to trade
reform. The current  explanations  of this  resistance  focus  on uncertainty
about  its  net  benefit  for  either  individuals  or groups. Thus,  Alesina  and
Drazen  (1991)  analyze  the "war  of attrition"  between  groups,  the "losers"
being  those  who have  to pay for  the costs  of structural  reform. FornAndez  and
Rodrik (1991),  in turn,  stress  the  role of individual-specific  uncertainty.
But in both  cases  the  reform  is assumed  to be welfare  improvlng  in the
aggregate. This is not  the case  here,  unless  there is a change  in labor
market  institutions  too.
A first  way to get  the  required  institutional  change  would  be that
workers  moved  by themselves  from  a Latin  American  to a Scandinavian  setting.
9  Something  similar  happens  in the  model  by Rama (forthcoming),
where fully  centralized  wage bargaining  is  better,  since  lt allows
exploiting  the country's  monopoly  power in  the foreign  market.
17Unfortunately,  union  members  face  no individual  incentive  to do such  a  move,
as shown  by the  corresponding  wage levels  in Figure  2.10 In thia sense,  the
two  Opureo  institutional  arrangements  considered  in  this  paper  are similar  to
the  symmetric  equilibria  (cooperation  and  defection)  of  a  Prisonners  Dilema.
Slipping  from  scandinavia  to Latin  America  seems  easy,  moving  the  other  way  is
unlikely.
A second  way to got rld  of Latin  Amerlcan  labor  market  lnstitutlons
would  be  just  banning  trade  unlons. This  may have  been one  of the  basLc
Lngredients  of the successful  Chlilean  trade liberalizatlon  of the 70c.
However,  as  long  an  there  is  imperfect  competition  Ln  the  domestic  sector,
workers  face  an  Lncentive  to  unionize.  ThLi  !s  because  having  the  monopoly  of
labor  supply  allows  explolting  the  monopoly  power  of  firms.  Therefore,  it  is
unclear  whether  this  second  possLbility  may  hold  without  a  significant  degree
of  polLtLcal  reproesLon.
In  fact,  according  to  the  model  in  this  paper,  the  key  to  trade  reform
in  countrles  with  Latln  American  labor  market  LnstLtutLons  would  be  to  make
the  domestic  sector  more  competitLve  (L.e.  to  Lncrease  a).  This  would
dLisspate  rents,  thus  reducing  the  wedge between  sectoral  nroductLvLties  and,
hence,  the  second-best  tarlff  level.  Note  that  the  need  for  this  improvement
in  competition  introduces  a  timing  issue  similar  to  the  one  discussed  by  the
development  llterature  in  the  early  eightLes,  concerning  the  "right"  sequence
of  flnancial  and  trade  liberalization.ii
10  A  similar  analyLsi  can  be  found  in  Cahuc  and  Zylberberg  (1991),
concerning  the  shift  from  sectoral  to centralized  wage bargaining
in the context  of a  closed  economy.
11  See  Edwards  and  van  Wijnbergen  (1983)  and  Edwards (1984).
is7.  Concluding  Remarks
Tho  model in  this  paper shede  some  light  on the  role of labor  market
institutions  in a  small  open economy. By choosing  two "pure"  institutlonal
settings,  it  accounts  for  wage dlfferentlals  of different  signs  in dLfferent
countries. It  also shows  that these  settLngs  have important  consequences  on
welfare. Finally,  it provides  a  rationale  for  both the "corporatist*
consensus  on free  trade  and  the "populiet"  resistance  to  trade  liberalization.
All  of  these  sem  in  accordance  with  the  historical  experiences  of
Scandinavian  and  Latin  American  countries  12
However,  rather  than  sunmarizing  the  results  of  the  paper,  lt is  worth
pointing  out  an  interesting  follow  up.  In  the model  above,  the level  of trade
barriers  is  unilaterally  determined  by  the  government.  Unions  act  as
followers,  since  they set  wages for  given  tariffs. But in fact,  the labor
movement  has  some incldence  on the  protection  level,  which  is likely  to result
from  some  sort  of  negotiation  between  unions  and  the  government.  Therefore,
further  steps  of  the  research  should  address  pollcy  making  in  a  more  realistic
manner.
In the  Scandinavian  case,  this  would not change  the  main results,  since
the  central  trade  union  and  the  government  share  the  same  objective  function.
Things  may  be  different  in  the  Latin  American  case,  because  unions  capture
some  of the  transfer  created  by trade  barriers. In order  to analyze  this
issue,  the  model should  probably  include  many imported  goods,  each of them
coupled  with  a  single  domestic-taste  substitute,  and  having  its  own  specific
tariff.
12  For a comprehensive  comparison  of these  experiences,  see  Blomstr8m
and  Heller (1991).
19APPEZNDIX
To be able  to compare  the  welfare  level  under  different  institutional
.settingu,  defines
1-a  1-f  a  X-1 1+a/(a-1)
(x)  - Z.{  e  (1-X)  x I  ax + (1-a-a) 1  }
This  function  boils  down  to Us(e s),  UM(OM) and  UL(eL)  when x le  equal  to 1,
(a-l)/u  and ((a-l)/la)  respectively. Moreover,  dS/dx  >  0 if x <  1 and  do/dx  -
o if x - 1.  Since  1 > (o-l)/o  > ((a-l)/a) 2, this implies  that  US(es)  is  the
lirst  best,  and  that  US(QS)  >  UM(eM) >  UL(eL). Qe.d.
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